IMG/jpg/1935said.jpg' alt='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf To Doc' title='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf To Doc' />The Vela Incident. By Carey Sublette. Last changed 1 September 2. The Vela Incident. On 2. 2 September 1. GMT, the Vela 6. 91. Indian Ocean or South Atlantic. The test location was later localized at 4. S, 4. 0 deg. E in the Indian Ocean, in the vicinity of South Africas Prince Edward Island, by hydroacoustic data. Due to the position ambiguity of the initial detection the Vela optical sensors were not imaging sensors and could did not detect location, the location is variously described as being in the Indian Ocean or South Atlantic. The characteristics of the light curve indicated that it was a low kiloton explosion approximately 3 kt. The hydroacoustic signal indicated a low altitude explosion. A major and lingering controversy erupted over the interpretation of this apparent detection. The Vela satellite program was an nuclear detonation NUDET detection system setup after the 1. There were two groups of Vela satellites developed. The original Vela were equipped only with sensors for space detection and were launched in three pairs between 1. They operated for at least five years, far beyond their nominal design life of six months. A second generation called Advanced Vela were launched in 1. These satellites added bahngmeters optical sensors for detecting atmospheric tests and had a nominal design life of 1. JPL 2. 00. 1 Astronautix 2. Vela 6. 91. 1 is presumably one of the Advanced Vela pair launch launched on 2. May 1. 96. 9 perigee 7. Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf FileThe Vela satellite system had previously made 4. The detection came at a bad time for the Carter administration which would be under pressure to take definite action if the detection were accepted as accurate. Inescapably it seemed that either Israel, South Africa, or both, would be implicated. Consequently a panel of scientists from academia known as the Ruina Panel, after its head Dr. Jack Ruina, was created to review the reliability of the Vela data. Since this satellite was operating past its expected lifespan, and its electromagnetic pulse EMP sensor was inoperative, questions about the reliability of the detection were raised. The panel ultimately concluded in a report released in the summer of 1. Although we cannot rule out that this signal was of nuclear origin. This conclusion has cast a pall over public confidence in the ability of the U. S. to unambiguously detect clandestine nuclear explosions for over twenty years. The Start of the Controversy. The instruments used by the Vela satellites for detecting atmospheric nuclear explosions are called bhangmeters. These are optical sensors that record light fluctuations on a sub millisecond time scale. All atmospheric nuclear explosions produce a unique and easy to detect signature an extremely short and intense flash, followed by a second much more prolonged and less intense emission of light. The initial flash is typically 1 millisecond long, and although it emits only about 1 of the total thermal energy of the fireball, it is actually the point of maximum brightness for the fireball. The second peak may take from hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds to develop, depending on the size of the explosion, and lasts a comparable period of time. This phenomenon occurs because the surface of the early fireball is quickly overtaken by the expanding hydrodynamic shock wave. This shock wave acts as an optical shutter, hiding the small but extremely hot and bright early fireball behind an opaque ionized shock front which is comparatively quite dim. No natural phenomenon is known that can imitate this signature. In fact it is reported that no false alarms have ever been detected with a Vela bhangmeter. Every other double flash detection has later been confirmed to be an actual nuclear test. According to Seymour Hersh, the idea of referring this detection to an advisory panel was floated before any potential problems with the detection had been noted. Download Microsoft Sql Server 2008 R2 System Clr Types For 2012 here. An urgent meeting to discuss the handling of this event was held in the White House situation room soon after the intelligence report on the incident reached the Oval Office. Among those attending were National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, his aide for global issues Gerald Oplinger, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Spurgeon Keeny, and Presidential Science Advisor Frank Press. WqxJy/526x297-EUq.jpg' alt='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf Editor' title='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf Editor' />At this meeting the probability of a nuclear test was placed at 9. Either Keeny or Press accounts of the participants vary suggested convening a panel at least as much as a delaying tactic as an effort to ensure that the data was carefully evaluated Hersh 1. There is no question that a confirmed detection of a nuclear test would have put the Carter administration in a very difficult position. President Carter had placed great emphasis on nuclear non proliferation. NLR6cover.gif' alt='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf' title='Edward Said Traveling Theory Pdf' />This web site was started on November 22, 2001 to keep track of facts related to the anthrax attacks which had become a major news event. Glenn Greenwald is the author of No Place to Hide Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U. S. Surveillance State. The administration had been a troubled one, with the recent collapse of a major ally in the Middle East Iran as one of many problems. The upcoming re election campaign was certain to be an uphill battle. If Israel were to be linked to a nuclear test as seemed likely, it it was real the political damage from imposing sanctions, or not imposing sanctions, would likely be severe. Within several weeks the eminent membership of the panel had been selected Jack P. Ruina, professor of electrical engineering at MIT and an alumnus of several defense think tanks, was the titular head, of the eight other members Nobel laureate Luis Alvarez, Wolfgang Panofsky of Stanford, and Richard Garwin of the Thomas Watson Research Center at IBM were the key players. The administration succeeded in keeping the detection secret until 2. October 1. 97. 9, when ABC television reporter John Scali broadcast the story after having been briefed by contacts at the Pentagon. From the outset the panel was given guidelines tailored to help give the Carter administration cover they were tasked to investigate whether the detection had been a false alarm including the possibility that it was of natural origin, possibly resulting from the conincidence of two or more natural phenomena. Given this mandate and focus it was perhaps inevitable that the result of the panels work would be the most plausible possible way to explain away the detection. It should be remembered that at the time of the panel first convened, no reason to doubt the detection had been identified. Problems were found with the Vela satellite data though the two bhangmeter readings did not agree on the flashes brightness, perhaps because the aged sensors were no longer equally sensitive. This discrepancy, and the lack of confirming data from the inoperable EMP sensor, emerged as the chief reasons for casting doubt on whether a nuclear test had actually occurred. Discrepancies had been observed in Vela signals from previous confirmed atmospheric nuclear tests however LANL Daily News Bulletin 1. During the panels months of deliberations, concluded in July 1. P One of the clearest indications was from ocean acoustic waves detected by hydrophones. The hydrophone data indicated signals both from a direct path originating near Prince Edward Island and from a reflection of Scotia Ridge in the Antarctic and the Antarctic ice shelf. Lao Font Software. Analyses of these signals conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory NRL confirmed that they had been generated at a time and location consistent with the Vela 6. This evidence alone, if accepted as valid, should be sufficient to confirm the accuracy of the detection LANL Daily News Bulletin 1. Albright 1. 99. 4b.